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INTANGIBLE PRIVACY RIGHTS: HOW EUROPE’S GDPR
WILL SET A NEW GLOBAL STANDARD FOR PERSONAL
DATA PROTECTION
Beata A. Safari*
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (“EU” or the “Union”) prides itself on the
extensive privacy protections it affords its citizens: protections that far
outweigh those provided to American citizens.1 The European Union
Charter on Fundamental Rights (“the Charter”), enacted in 2000,
provides the basis for European recognition of the importance of
protecting personal data.2 Under Article 8 of the Charter, “[e]veryone
has the right to the protection of personal data3 concerning him or
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1
Instead of the omnibus approach of the European Union, the United States has
a variety of statutes and regulatory agencies which cover aspects of privacy law. These
statutes include, but are not limited to, the following: The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986 (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); Cybersecurity Information Act of 2015,
6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1533 (2012); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
(BSA), Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-2 (2012). See Daniel Dimov, Differences between
the Privacy Laws in the EU and the US, INFOSEC INST. (Jan. 10, 2013), http://resources.
infosecinstitute.com/differences-privacy-laws-in-eu-and-us/.
2
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Explanations Relating to the
Complete Text of the Charter, EUR. UNION COUNCIL 26 (Dec. 2000), http://www.consilium
.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/Explanation%20relating%20to%20
the%20complete%20text%20of%20the%20charter.pdf.
3
“Personal data” is defined as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable legal person (‘data subject’).” “Processing of personal data” is “any
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not
by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation
or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or
destruction.” Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter
Data Protection Directive].
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her,” particularly with regard to the fair processing of data “for
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”4 Directive
95/46/EC (“Data Protection Directive” or “the Directive”) influenced
the freedom of protection of personal data, notably in its preamble
where it acknowledges differences in the levels of protection with
respect to the right to privacy and that “the processing of personal data
afforded in the Member States may prevent the transmission of such
data from the territory of one Member State to that of another
Member State.”5 Most Americans could not fathom the importance
privacy holds to Europeans: one popular theory describes this
phenomenon as the difference between valuing liberty, for Americans,
and dignity, for Europeans.6
Data protection is so important to European citizens that the
European Union requires foreign entities—particularly the United
States, where most technology companies are headquartered—to
adhere to its stringent requirements.7 The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
Framework (“Safe Harbor Framework” or “Safe Harbor”) was created
by the U.S. Department of Commerce working with the European
Commission (“the Commission”) as a means of implementing the
“adequacy” framework adopted by the European Union’s Data
Protection Directive.8 Under the adequacy framework, American
4

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C
364/1).
5
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at art. 7.
6
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1163 (2004) (“If I may use a cosmological metaphor: American privacy
law is a body caught in the gravitational orbit of liberty values, while European law is
caught in the orbit of dignity. There are certainly times when the two bodies of law
approach each other more or less nearly. Yet they are consistently pulled in different
directions, and the consequence is that these two legal orders really do meaningfully
differ: Continental Europeans are consistently more drawn to problems touching on
public dignity, while Americans are consistently more drawn to problems touching on
the depredations of the state. Indeed, as our many transatlantic conflicts suggest, the
distances between us can often stretch into the unbridgeable.”).
7
Companies must adhere to requirements because the Data Protection Directive
promises EU citizens protection of personal data, which cannot be achieved without
the participation of the countries from whence the data originates. Safe Harbor
Certification, PRIVACYTRUST (Feb. 2016), http://www.privacytrust.com/guidance/safe_
harbor.html. A list of all participants in the Safe Harbor Framework can be found at
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor List, U.S. DEP’T COM., https://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx (last
visited Dec. 20, 2016) (a user types an identifier of the company in the search for
“Organization Name,” which brings up the name of the organization as it was certified,
how long it is U.S.-EU certified for, and the nature of its personal data).
8
Welcome to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, U.S. DEP’T COM. (Jan. 26, 2017, 12:38 PM),
http://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp [hereinafter Safe Harbor
Overview]. See Safe Harbor Certification, supra note 7.

SAFARI_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

4/16/2017 3:56 PM

COMMENT

811

organizations avoided interruptions or delays in their dealings with the
Union due to EU member states (“Member States”) privacy laws.9 The
program provided a number of benefits to participating American and
European organizations, including: delivering “adequate” privacy
protection; binding Member States by the European Commission’s
finding of “adequacy”; bringing claims by EU citizens in the United
States; and structuring compliance requirements to be cost-effective,
with the benefit resting on small and medium businesses.10
Although in 1995 the Data Protection Directive set an
unprecedented foundation for personal data protection, in 2012, the
European Union proposed a reform of data protection rules11 because
protection has not remained current through the immense
technological advances that have taken place since. Furthermore, the
nature of the legislation has prevented every EU Member State from
implementing uniform standards across the board.12 Now, the new
proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), if successful,
will “make Europe fit for the digital age.”13
This Comment argues that certain articles in the GDPR would
impose greater requirements for data privacy, for example, the
provisions on “profiling,” the right to data portability, and the “right
to be forgotten.” The directive proposed to accompany the GDPR in
the areas of investigation and prosecution, among other police duties,
in relation to criminal offenses and other judicial activities,14 is outside
the scope of this Comment. Additionally, the focus in this Comment
is on “controllers” of personal data, not on “processors” of personal
data.15 Part II explores the goals of the Data Protection Directive and
9

Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 8.
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles: Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce on July 21,
2000, U.S. DEP’T COM. (Jan. 30, 2009, 3:03 PM), http://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/
eu/eg_main_018475.asp.
11
Protection of personal data, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
12
Press Release, European Comm’n, Agreement on Commission’s EU data
protection reform will boost Digital Single Market (Dec. 15. 2015), europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm.
13
Id.
14
Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission proposes a comprehensive
reform of data protection rules to increase users’ control of their data and to cut costs
for businesses (Jan. 25, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.pdf
[hereinafter Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection rules].
15
A “controller” is “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data.” Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 27 April 2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
10
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the Safe Harbor Framework, as well as some of their major criticisms,
leading to the adoption of the new GDPR and the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield. Part III breaks down strengths and weaknesses of the GDPR,
introduces the cases which influenced change in the Union’s privacy
regime, and analyzes how some key articles would affect foreign
entities. Part IV discusses how data privacy changes would affect the
future affairs of a company such as LinkedIn through application of
the provisions and analysis discussed in Part III. Part V aggregates the
analysis from Part IV and superimposes it upon anticipated new
technological advances and the effectiveness of the GDPR in light of
those advances. Finally, Part VI, the conclusion, condenses the
information in this Comment to predict the implications of the GDPR
on a new global privacy standard.
II. THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE: IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EU
AND THE U.S.
A. Goals of Data Protection Directive
When the Data Protection Directive passed on October 24, 1995,
it was approved in the context of two pieces of legislation: the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s
“Recommendations of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing
the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows of Personal Data.”16
Article 8 of the ECHR introduces the right to respect one’s private and
family life, home, and correspondence, stating:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of: national security; public safety or the economic wellbeing
of the country; for the prevention of disorder or crime; for
the protection of health or morals; or for the protection of

repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 4(7), 2016
O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR Provisions]. A “processor” is “a natural or legal
person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf
of the controller.” Id. art. 4(8) (emphasis added). For a list of the kinds of services that
a controller could complete which a processor cannot, see Vanessa Barnett, Data
controllers and data processors: what is the difference?, CHARLESRUSSELLSPEECHLYS (June 4,
2014), https://www.charlesrussellspeechlys.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/tmt
/2014/data-controllers-and-data-processors-what-is-the-difference/.
16
The OECD Guidelines have since been updated. 2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines,
ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_
privacy_framework.pdf.
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the rights and freedoms of others.17
The goals for implementing the Directive were an amalgamation
of the promotion of free-flowing data and the protection of
fundamental human rights. Under the preamble, the Directive was
meant to encourage the easy flow of personal data from one Member
State to another, while also preserving fundamental rights of
individuals.18 The general facilitation of cross-border flows of personal
data was a major factor. The Commission also recognized that the
processing of data carried out by a person in a third country should
not interfere with the protection granted to European Union citizens.19
In addition, the processing of personal data must be carried out with
the consent of the individual, unless the personal data may be
disclosed due to legitimate ordinary business activities of companies.20
In the context of the advancement of human rights goals, the Directive
sought to strengthen and promote peace and liberty and other
fundamental freedoms as provided in the European Convention,
primarily the right to privacy.21 Although not expressly provided for in
the Directive, article 12(b) could be considered the first real primer
on the “right to be forgotten.”22
B. Safe Harbor Framework
Until February 2016, the Safe Harbor Framework allowed
American companies to enter the European marketplace through an
assurance that the American companies were complying with the basic
data requirements imposed by the Data Protection Directive.23
Entering into the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework was an entirely
voluntary decision and required adherence to only a few conditions.
17

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
18
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, ¶¶ 8, 9 (“[I]n order to remove the
obstacles to flows of personal data, the level of protection of the rights and freedoms
of individuals with regard to the processing of such data must be equivalent in all
Member States . . . . Member States will no longer be able to inhibit the free movement
between them of personal data on grounds relating to protection of the rights and
freedoms of individuals, and in particular the right to privacy . . . .”).
19
Id. ¶ 20 (“[T]he fact that the processing of data is carried out by a person
established in a third country must not stand in the way of the protection of individuals
provided for in this Directive . . . .”).
20
Id. ¶ 30 (“[T]he processing of personal data must in addition be carried out
with the consent of the data subject or be necessary for the conclusion or performance
of a contract binding on the data subject . . . .”).
21
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at pmbl. (1), (2).
22
Id. art. 12.
23
Although, arguably, the Safe Harbor Framework is not defunct until the EUU.S. Privacy Shield is fully in place. Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 8.
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To qualify for membership in the program, an organization could
either join a self-regulatory privacy program that already adhered to
the requirements, or it could develop its own self-regulatory privacy
program in conformance with the framework.
Beyond that,
compliance was monitored by adherence to the seven Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles, which are: (1) notice; (2) choice; (3) onward
transfer; (4) access; (5) security; (6) data integrity; and (7)
enforcement.24
The notice principle required organizations to notify data users
about the purposes for which information was collected and used.25
The choice principle required that data users be given the opportunity
to opt out from disclosing personal information to a third party.26 For
sensitive information, an explicit choice must have been given if the
information would have been disclosed to a third party or used for a
purpose other than originally intended.27 The onward transfer
principle simply acknowledged that in order to disclose information to
a third party, an organization must have complied with the notice and
choice principles.28 The organization needed to ensure that the third
party subscribed to the Safe Harbor Framework principles (or it
needed to enter into a contractual agreement to confirm that it did
so).29 The access principle required data users to have access to
information about themselves that the company held, and to have the
ability to correct, amend, or delete information.30 This access principle
resembles the “right to be forgotten” principles, in that the General
Data Protection Regulation, described in detail infra Part III.C., would
ensure that users have the ability to control their level of engagement,
as well as the extent of the personal data they share. The security
principle charged organizations to implement precautions in
protecting personal information from loss, misuse and unauthorized
access, disclosure, alteration, and destruction.31 The data integrity
principle needed organizations to take sensible steps to ensure that
data was reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and
current.32 The enforcement principle required: (1) instantly available
and affordable mechanisms so that each individual’s complaints and
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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disputes could be investigated and resolved; (2) procedures to validate
that commitments to Safe Harbor principles had been adhered to; and
(3) commitments to solve problems arising out of failure to comply
with the principles.33
Some of the most prominent criticisms of the Safe Harbor
Framework include: a failure to renew certification, lack of
certification or receipt of certification twice, distribution of false and
misleading information regarding certification under the Framework,
and a difficulty in establishing enforcement mechanisms and following
through with complaints.34 With regard to the lack of adequate
compliance, only 348 out of 1109 registered organizations under the
Safe Harbor complied with the most basic requirements of the
Framework.35 The Safe Harbor had not worked properly in a long
time, so when the European Union proposed the General Data
Protection Regulation, it was clear that the United States would be
directly affected. Thus, negotiations between the United States
Commerce Department and the European Commission commenced.

33

Id.
See CHRIS CONNOLLY, THE US SAFE HARBOR – FACT OR FICTION? 1, 4, 7 (2008),
http://www.galexia.com/public/research/assets/safe_harbor_fact_or_fiction_2008/
safe_harbor_fact_or_fiction.pdf. See, e.g., Comm’n of the European Communities, The
application of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data
provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked Questions issued
by the US Department of Commerce 8 (Working Paper No. SEC(2002) 196),
http://web.archive.org/web/20060724174359/http://www.ec.europa.eu/justice_ho
me/fsj/privacy/docs/adequacy/sec-2002-196/sec-2002-196_en.pdf (“A substantial
number of organisations that have self-certified do not meet the requirement in FAQ
6 [on self-certification] quoted above. For some, no public statement of adherence to
the Safe Harbour Principles could be found, apart from the self-certification itself. For
a small number, the privacy policy mentioned in the self-certification could not be
accessed.”); Comm’n of the Communities, The implementation of Commission Decision
520/2000/EC on the adequate protection of personal data provided by the Safe Harbour privacy
Principles and related Frequently Asked Questions issued by the US Department of Commerce 7–
8 (Working Document No. SEC(2004) 1323) (“Regarding the enforcement Principle,
which requires companies to identify either an Alternative Dispute Resolution body or
the EU panel to hear individuals’ complaints, the Commission notes that a number of
companies fail to do so. When companies select the EU panel, almost all of them fail
to state their commitment to comply with the advice of the EU panel as required by
FAQ 9 [when HR data is transferred from Europe to a Safe Harbor organization], or
to indicate how the EU panel can be contacted. When companies select ADRs, they
often fail to inform individuals of the arrangements for taking up complaints with the
ADR.”).
35
See CONNOLLY, supra note 34, at 4.
34
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C. American Involvement in the GDPR and EU-U.S. Privacy Shield
Extensive American involvement in the drafting of the GDPR,
discussed further infra Part II.D, and implementation of changes in the
Safe Harbor Framework have culminated in the new EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield (“Privacy Shield”).36 In 2013, American companies and the
American government lobbied at length to amend provisions
requiring businesses to obtain explicit consent from consumers before
collecting data, and to take out provisions that would allow consumers
to remove all traces of personal data upon request.37 Since then, the
United States remained actively engaged in negotiations for the
enactment of a new safe harbor agreement in Brussels.38 In fact,
American involvement has been so extensive that LobbyPlag, a website
whose purpose consists of delivering greater transparency of ongoing
deliberations in the European Commission about the GDPR by leaking
documents,39 is merely one among about a dozen privacy groups that
called on the U.S. government to cease its “unprecedented lobbying
campaign.”40
Aside from the imposition of American beliefs on European
citizens, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology began a
collaborative project with the University of Amsterdam called the EUU.S. Privacy Bridge Project (“Bridge Project”) in May 2014, whose aim
is to “bridge the gap between the data privacy regimes in the United
States and the European Union,” thus strengthening the framework of
the Safe Harbor.41 The Bridge Project published its recommendations
36

Rob Price, Europe Narrowly Avoided a Major Disaster for American Businesses – For
Now, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/privacyshield-european-regulators-article-29-working-party-full-text-2016-2?r=UK&IR=T.
37
Kevin Collier, U.S. Lobbyists Are Writing Europe’s Data Protection Rules, DAILY DOT
(Feb. 11, 2013, 14:25 CT), http://www.dailydot.com/news/us-lobbyists-europeandata-privacy/. The U.S. government struggled with the notion that personal data
could be removed upon request of the individual affected: this is contrary to the
drafting of American statutes, such as the CAN-SPAM Act, and to the philosophy of
“opting out.” See infra note 101.
38
Mark Scott, Data Transfer Pact Between U.S. and Europe Is Ruled Invalid, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1OhKvgl.
39
Governments, LOBBYPLAG (Jan. 16, 2016, 2:14 EST), http://www.lobbyplag.eu/
governments.
40
Collier, supra note 37 (“[T]here are 64 instances where proposed amendments
to the Data Protection Regulation have text identical to passages from previouslywritten lobbyist memos.”); Zack Whittaker, Privacy Groups Call on US Government to Stop
Lobbying Against EU Data Law Changes, ZDNET (Feb. 4, 2013, 6:00 GMT),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/privacy-groups-call-on-us-government-to-stoplobbying-against-eu-data-law-changes/.
41
Privacy Bridges Project Mission, MASS. INST. TECH., https://privacybridges.mit.edu
/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017). See also Cynthia O’Donoghue & Katalina Bateman, EU-
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in September 2015, offering ten “bridges” to enhancing a “progressive,
sustainable model for protecting privacy in the global Internet
environment.”42 Although the Bridge Project is not a governmental
initiative, it does have “soft support” from the European Commission
and did have “soft support” from the Obama Administration,43 so it
could be a step in the right direction if the EU and U.S. choose to
adhere to the recommendations.
D. The Doubtful Efficacy of the Privacy Shield
On February 2, 2016, the European Union and United States
confirmed that the European Commission and Department of
Commerce had agreed upon the provisions of the Privacy Shield.44
The United States Secretary of Commerce, Penny Pritzker, referred to
the agreement as the “product of two years of productive discussions
among [European and American] teams.”45 Laura E. Gardner, from
the Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce—
speaking on her own behalf—stated that, “We are really confident that
we addressed all of the concerns” from the court, EU Commission, and
critics.46 She exuded excitement at the steady in-flow of selfcertifications from American companies; she claimed that nearly 300
had been completed at the time.47 At the same time, Gardner
US
Privacy
Bridge
Project
Announced,
REEDSMITH
(May
8,
2014),
http://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2014/05/privacy-data-protection/eu-usprivacy-bridge-project-announced/; Angela R. Matney et al., The Challenges of ThirdParty Data Privacy Protection, 61 RISK MGMT. 32, 34 (2014).
42
JEAN-FRANÇOIS ABRAMATIC ET AL., PRIVACY BRIDGES: EU AND US PRIVACY EXPERTS
IN SEARCH OF TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY SOLUTIONS (2015), http://privacybridges.mit.
edu/sites/default/files/documents/PrivacyBridges-FINAL.pdf.
43
Matney et al., supra note 41, at 34.
44
Press Release, European Commission, EU Commission and United States agree
on new framework for transatlantic data flows: EU-US Privacy Shield (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-216_en.htm.
45
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, 2016 O.J. (L 207)
(Annex I) 1 (letter from U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker).
46
Laura E. Gardner, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Int’l
Commerce, U.S. Dep’t Com., Address at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium (Sept.
30, 2016) [hereinafter Gardner Address].
47
Id. Since then, it appears that more than 500 companies have self-certified,
which still falls far short of the over 4,400 companies certified under the Safe Harbor
Framework. Peter Loshin, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield certification process picks up steam, slowly,
TECHTARGET (Oct. 21, 2016, 8:30 AM EST), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/
news/450401509
/EU-US-Privacy-Shield-certification-process-picks-up-steam-slowly [hereinafter EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield]. See, e.g., MobileIron Receives EU-US Privacy Shield Certification from US
Department of Commerce, NEWSWIRE ASS’N LLC (Dec. 19, 2016, 2:00 PM EST),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/mobileiron-receives-eu-us-privacy-shield-
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acknowledged that the Privacy Shield complies with the Data
Protection Directive, and not the GDPR; she asserted that the
Commerce Department is aware of this and will adjust.48 Per this
adjustment process, Gardner provided that this process offers an
opportunity to cooperate with the European Union, so the Commerce
Department will adapt and respond to changes in Europe and the
United States: “We are going to keep working with Europe.”49
The four major changes that the EU Commission and the United
States claim will take effect as a result of the new framework are: (1)
greater responsibilities on companies exchanging with European
users; (2) a more capable enforcement structure; (3) clearer security
measures and more transparency of American government access; and
(4) competent and adequate protection of European citizens’ rights
with multiple avenues for reparations.50 It is of note that the United
States has agreed to deliver clear limitations and oversight mechanisms
which would greatly diminish the U.S.’s ability to engage in
surveillance.51 It has also agreed to refrain from indiscriminate mass
surveillance.52 With regard to the last element, the Privacy Shield
would institute formal deadlines for companies to reply to complaints,
and alternative dispute resolution would be provided without a fee.53
The United States has assured the European Commission that it
will institute an annual joint review, discussing the companies’
adherence to the principles.54 The Privacy Shield aims to provide
Europeans the opportunity for redress in the United States through
the Judicial Redress Act of 2015, whose purpose is to “extend Privacy
Act remedies to citizens of certified states,” with the European Union
being one of those certified states under section 2(d)(1)(A)(i), as it
“has entered into an agreement with the United States that provides
for appropriate privacy protections for information.”55
Reports about the new provisions have proved lukewarm, at best.

certification-from-us-department-of-commerce-300380686.html; Ultimate Completes
Certification for Cloud Security Standard ISO 27018, BUSINESSWIRE (Dec. 19, 2016),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20161219
005684/en/Ultimate-Completes-Certification-Cloud-Security-Standard-ISO.
48
Gardner Address, supra note 46.
49
Id.
50
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, supra note 47.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (H. R. 1428), Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282
(2016).
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Critics have expressed concern that the Privacy Shield will not become
enforceable because it will not pass court scrutiny, European Member
States will not agree to pass it, and the document has no teeth to it.56
According to the Harvard Business Review, the Privacy Shield “will
likely do nothing to add even a modicum of new protection to the
personal information of European citizens.”57 The man who almost
single-handedly brought about the demise of the Safe Harbor
Framework, Maximilian Schrems (discussed infra Part III.D.ii), found
the Privacy Shield lackluster: “There are tiny improvements, but the
core rules on private data usage are miles away for EU law. This is
nowhere close to ‘essential equivalence’ that the Court required.”58
Schrems even went so far as to say, “They put ten layers of lipstick on a
pig but I doubt the [Court and Data Protection Authorities] suddenly
want to cuddle with it.”59
Confirming the predictions of many, in September 2016, a privacy
group filed a challenge in the General Court of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ).60 There is very little known about the challenge so far,
and according to the procedure of the ECJ, it would take more than a
year for the matter to be heard.61 What is clear is that the privacy
56

See generally Caroline Craig, EU-US Privacy Shield Offers Flimsy Protection,
INFOWORLD (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.infoworld.com/article/3029969/privacy/euus-privacy-shield-offers-flimsy-protection.html; Larry Downes, The Business Implications
of the EU-U.S. “Privacy Shield”, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/02/the-business-implications-of-the-eu-u-s-privacy-shield;
Natasha Lomas, Draft Text of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Deal Fails To Impress The Man Who
Slayed Safe Harbor, TECHCRUNCH DAILY (Feb. 29, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/
02/29/lipstick-on-a-pig/.
57
Downes, supra note 56.
58
Lomas, supra note 56.
59
David Gilbert, Safe Harbor 2.0: Max Schrems Calls ‘Privacy Shield’ National Security
Loopholes ‘Lipstick On A Pig’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016, 1:30 PM), http://www.ib
times.com/safe-harbor-20-max-schrems-calls-privacy-shield-national-securityloopholes-lipstick-2327277 (quoting @MaxSchrems, TWITTER (Feb. 29, 2016)).
60
Action brought on 16 September 2016 – Digital Rights v Commission (Case T-670/16),
CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=185146&
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=423368
(last
visited Dec. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Digital Rights v Commission] (reader should make
sure that the “Language of document” is in “English”).
61
There is no mention in the ECJ Rules of Procedure how long the court could
take to decide a case; yet, given that the privacy group concerned did not request an
urgent preliminary ruling, the decision will likely not be expedited. The President of
the Court may, however, separately consider whether urgency is necessary. Consolidated
Version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012, EUR. CT. JUST.
arts. 107–08 (2012), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/
2012-10/rp_en.pdf. See also Reuters, This Privacy Group is Challenging the U.S.-EU Data
Pact, FORTUNE.COM (Oct. 27, 2016, 8:59 AM EST), http://fortune.com/2016/10/27/
privacy-data-eu-us/.
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group, Digital Rights Ireland, petitions the court to “declare that the
[Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July
2016]62 is null and void” and to “order the annulment of the
[Commission Implementing Decision] relating to the adequacy of the
protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield.”63 Among the court’s
challenges will be to determine whether the Privacy Shield is even of
direct concern to the privacy group, a standing issue.64
It remains to be seen what the legacy of the Privacy Shield will be.
While it is too early to know how it will be treated in the courts, the
Privacy Shield has been accepted by the European Commission65—
which means that Member States must adhere to the decision66—and
the European Court of Justice will likely not come face-to-face with the
agreement until late 2017 or early 2018. Notwithstanding any
challenges, it is law, so businesses will need to adapt, fast. As the
Department of Commerce is aware, the Privacy Shield needs
modification to conform to the provisions of the GDPR, which will
replace the Data Protection Directive in May 2018.67
III. THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR)
A. The Distinction Between Directives and Regulations
There is an important distinction between EU directives and
regulations, and that distinction is among the reasons why the
European Commission strived to replace the Data Protection Directive
by a regulation. Directives are broad, goal-driven pieces of legislation
which provide guidelines for Member State implementation, but
depend on the independent passage of a law in every Member State

62

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, supra note 45, at art. 13
(“The Commission has carefully analysed U.S. law and practice, including these official
representations and commitments. Based on the findings developed in recitals 136140, the Commission concludes that the United States ensures an adequate level of
protection for personal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield from the
Union to self-certified organisations in the United States.”).
63
Digital Rights v Commission, supra note 60.
64
See This Privacy Group is Challenging the U.S.-EU Data Pact, supra note 61.
65
See generally Commission Implementing Decision, supra note 45.
66
For a description of how the European Commission works, see generally
European Commission at Work, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/index_
en.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (for more information, click on “How decisions are
made” and “Decision-making during weekly meetings”).
67
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 51(4) (“Each Member State shall notify
to the Commission the provisions of its law which it adopts pursuant to this Chapter,
by 25 May 2018 and, without delay, any subsequent amendment affecting them.”).
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within a designated period of time.68 Regulations are narrow, specific
pieces of legislation which become immediately enforceable—and
binding—in every Member State without implementing a law in each
State.69 When the European Commission first considered reforming
data protection, it was not yet clear that a directive would be replaced
by a regulation.70 The Commission committed to addressing the
following issues:
(1) Addressing the impact of new technologies;
(2) Enhancing the internal market dimension of data
protection;
(3) Addressing globalisation and improving international
data transfers;
(4) Providing a stronger institutional arrangement for the
effective enforcement of data protection rules;
(5) Improving the coherence of the data protection legal
framework.71
The first challenge, addressing the impact of new technologies,
focuses on the difficulty in ensuring free and informed consent, and
securing sensitive data, thus assuring transparency for individuals on
the Internet.72 The second challenge in enhancing the internal market
dimension of data protection takes into account the limited remedies
available to nationals for bringing complaints in front of their courts,
ensuring legal certainty, and curtailing the administrative burden of
the notification system.73 In responding to the third challenge—
improving international data transfers—the Commission likely only
envisioned the passage of a new law in the European Union; that would
not have been sufficient. However, the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield
supposedly has solved that challenge, as discussed supra Part II.C. The
fourth and fifth challenges refer to the issue discussed supra, in that
the Directive is incapable of addressing the inconsistencies across the
European Member States because currently each State imposes
different regulatory schemes and provides greater protections than

68

See generally Regulations, Directives and other Acts, EUR. UNION (Dec. 16, 2016),
http://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en.
69
Id.
70
See generally Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 7, COM
(2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data
Protection].
71
Id. at 3–4.
72
Id. at 6, 8–9.
73
Id. at 10–13.
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others in some areas, as well as fewer in others.74
The text of the new articles in the GDPR grants users, inter alia,
new rights and creates the European Data Protection Board. Article 7
provides conditions for consent;75 article 15 creates a right of access for
the data subject;76 article 16 produces a right to rectification;77 article
17 forms the bread and butter of the right to be forgotten and to
erasure;78 article 20 informs the right to data portability;79 article 21
discusses the right to object to the processing of one’s personal data
for direct marketing;80 article 22 explains profiling and the new
measures put into effect;81 article 68 sets up the European Data
Protection Board;82 and article 70 describes the tasks of the newlyformed Board.83

74

Id. at 17–18.
If a data subject—“an identified or identifiable natural person”—needs to give
consent, the requirement must be clear. GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at arts. 4(1),
7. A subject has the right to withdraw consent at any time. Id. art. 7(3).
76
The article provides data subject’s right of access to personal data,
supplementing the need to inform data subjects of a storage period and of rights to
rectification and to erasure and to lodge a complaint. Id. art. 15.
77
“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without
undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her.
Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the
right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a
supplementary statement.” Id. art. 16.
78
“Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged
pursuant to [of article 17(1)] to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account
of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps,
including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal
data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to,
or copy or replication of, those personal data.” Id. art. 17(2).
79
“The data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning
him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly
used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to
another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data
have been provided, where: (a) the processing is based on consent . . . or on a
contract . . . ; and (b) the processing is carried out by automated means.” Id. art. 20(1).
80
Id. art. 21.
81
A data user has the right not to be subject to a measure producing a quasidiscriminatory effect, “based solely on automated processing, including profiling,
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects
him or her.” GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, art. 22(1). The article goes on to list
exceptions to the subjection of the measure. Id. art. 22(2).
82
“The European Data Protection Board . . . is hereby established as a body of the
Union and shall have legal personality.” Id. art. 68.
83
The Board hereby has duties to advise the Commission; examine Members;
review the application of the guidelines; make recommendations and best practices;
issue opinions; promote cooperation; promote common training programs; and
promote exchange of knowledge. Id. art. 70.
75
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B. Alignment with Europe 2020 Strategy
Europe 2020 was a strategy proposed by the European
Commission on March 3, 2010, to advance the EU’s economy.84
Specifically, the Commission sought to create “smart, sustainable,
inclusive growth”85 and increased coordination of national and
European policy. The Commission proposed five measurable targets
to complete by the year 2020, which are: (1) employment; (2) research
and innovation; (3) climate change and energy; (4) education; and (5)
combating poverty.86 The Commission proposed a priority theme
called “a digital agenda for Europe,” under which Member States
would “speed up the roll-out of high-speed internet and reap the
benefits of a digital single market for households and firms.”87
Under “A Digital Agenda for Europe,” the proposal lists elements
that the Commission will work on—at the EU level—to produce
sustainable economic and social benefits from what it calls a “Digital
Single Market.”88 One of the elements has the following broad-based
aim:
To create a true single market for online content and services
(i.e. borderless and safe EU web services and digital content
markets, with high levels of trust and confidence, a balanced
regulatory framework with clear rights regimes, the fostering of
multi-territorial licences, adequate protection and remuneration
for rights holders and active support for the digitisation of
Europe’s rich cultural heritage, and to shape the global
governance of the internet . . . .89
In the Communication on Digital Agenda for Europe, the
European Commission stresses the need to create a “vibrant digital
single market,”90 because the detachment of policies among the
84

Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM (2010) 2020
(Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Europe 2020]. For a brief and pictorial explanation of
ordinary legislative procedure in the European Parliament, see Legislative Powers:
Ordinary legislative procedure, EUR. UNION (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers.
85
Europe 2020, supra note 84, at 3. Smart growth is “developing an economy based
on knowledge and innovation”; sustainable growth is “promoting a more resource
efficient, greener, and more competitive economy;” inclusive growth is “fostering a
high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion.” Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 4.
88
Id. at 11–12. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A
Digital Agenda for Europe, COM (2010) 245 final/2 (Aug. 26, 2010) [hereinafter A
Digital Agenda for Europe].
89
Europe 2020, supra note 84, at 12 (emphasis added).
90
A Digital Agenda for Europe, supra note 88, at 7.
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Member States stifles competitiveness in the digital economy
worldwide. The Commission must recognize that some of the most
successful Internet businesses are based out of the United States; as a
result, there is inconsistent implementation of rules across Member
States. This inconsistency calls for transparency in defining the scope
of data users’ rights and legal protection when doing business online.
A regulation, as opposed to the current Directive, would be a huge
step towards increasing coordination of national and European policy.
This way, certain Member States that might otherwise not be
predisposed to a safer security framework would need to work harder
to achieve the standards that other Member States have worked more
intensively to attain because of the initial Directive. A regulation would
place all Member States on equal footing, as opposed to the drastic
variations the Member States have upheld thus far, leading to a
disjunctive result. If the European Union intends to impose stricter
guidelines on foreign companies, it certainly must be a model for its
new policies worldwide. On December 15, 2015, negotiations between
the EU Commission, Parliament, and Council concluded, resulting in
the GDPR.91
C. Strengths and Weaknesses in the GDPR92
Before the text of the GDPR became public information in
December 2015, LobbyPlag released a current version of the GDPR
proposal, so users could scroll through the document and see what text
the Commission proposed and the Council removed, what sections the
Council inserted, and the commentary from LobbyPlag as to what
would likely be a stronger or weaker law than its predecessor.93 In this
subsection, the focus will be on identifying the strengths and
weaknesses in the GDPR, but limited to the scope of the articles of
interest, specifically articles 6, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, and 83.
1. Article 83 – Administrative Fines
Businesses would certainly agree that the most disquieting change
to the GDPR is article 83, which provides conditions for imposing

91

Reform of EU data protection rules, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/just
ice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
92
Strengths and weaknesses are evaluated based on the enforceability of the
separate provisions.
93
Regulation Proposal, LOBBYPLAG (Jan. 15, 2016, 15:12), http://www.lobbyplag
.eu/governments/gdpr [hereinafter Regulation Proposal]. The official text of the
GDPR can be found at supra note 15.
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administrative fines.94 Given the difference between directives and
regulations, the Directive did not have the power to institute a “one
size fits all” regimen for liability; the European Commission handed
that discretion off to the Member States and their supervisory
authorities.95 The GDPR continues the tradition of the supervisory
authorities under article 51, but for the first time provides two
definitive levels of administrative fines under article 83.96 Now, fines
could range from 10,000,000 and two percent of the company’s total
annual turnover, or anywhere from 20,000,000 to four percent of the
company’s annual turnover, whichever is higher in either case.97 To
put these numbers into perspective, consider Google’s revenue, which
was $74.5 billion in 2015.98 A range from two percent of its turnover to
four percent would be from $1.49 billion ( 1.43 billion) to $2.98
billion ( 2.85 billion). Money talks: the new enforcement mechanism
certainly discourages indifference and encourages compliance.
2. Article 7 – Conditions for Consent
When a data subject provides explicit consent under article
9(2)(a), article 7(2) requires that consent be given as a written
declaration that is “clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in
an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain
language.”99 Consent may be withdrawn at any time, but any
94

GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 83.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at art. 23 (“Member States shall provide
that any person who has suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing
operation or of any act incompatible with the national provisions adopted pursuant to
this Directive is entitled to receive compensation from the controller for the damage
suffered.”); id. art. 24 (“The Member States shall adopt suitable measures to ensure
the full implementation of the provisions of this Directive and shall in particular lay
down the sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive.”).
96
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 51(1) (“The Member States shall adopt
suitable measures to ensure the full implementation of the provisions of this Directive
and shall in particular lay down the sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement
of the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive.”); id. art. 83.
97
Id. arts. 83(4), 83(5). For a concise breakdown of the levels of administrative
fines and infringement of which articles would affect which level, see Nuria Pastor &
Georgina Lawrence, Getting to know the GDPR, Part 10 – Enforcement under the GDPR –
what happens if you get it wrong?, FIELD FISHER (Mar. 5, 2016, 15:19), http://privacylaw
blog.fieldfisher.com/2016/getting-to-know-the-gdpr-part-10-enforcement-under-thegdpr-what-happens-if-you-get-it-wrong/.
98
Google, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2015), at 23, https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000165204416000012/goog10-k2015.htm
(“Google segment revenues of $74.5 billion with revenue growth of 14% and Other
Bets revenues of $0.4 billion.”).
99
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 7(2).
95
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processing of information based on the consent already granted could
be lawfully processed; before giving consent, the data subject would be
made aware of these circumstances and the controller has a duty to
inform about the right to withdraw consent.100 These two subsections
evidence a substantially strict rule for consent through terms or privacy
policies, one that is not akin to what American companies are used to,
with their opt-out mechanisms.101
3. Articles 9 & 16 – Processing of Special Categories of
Personal Data, and Right to Rectification
Article 9 shapes the processing of special categories of personal
data. Personal data, particularly that revealing race or ethnicity,
political affiliation, religion or beliefs, or genetic, health or sex life, is
prohibited.102 A significant change from the Directive is that personal
data now includes genetic and biometric data.103 A substantial strength
of the article also consists in its limitation of third-country transfers of
“health data,” because it requires that data be managed by a medical
professional who is answerable to a duty of professional secrecy,
whether it is through a third State or a national body.104 Article 16
delineates the right to rectification, which provides a data subject with
100

Id. art. 7(3) (“The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of
processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data
subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.”).
101
Compare CAN-SPAM Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 316, § 316.5 (2012) (“Prohibition on
charging a fee or imposing other requirements on recipients who wish to opt out.”),
with Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic
communications), art. 13(3), 2002 O.J. (L 201) (“Member States shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that, free of charge, unsolicited communications for purposes of
direct marketing, in cases other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, are not
allowed either without the consent of the subscribers concerned or in respect of
subscribers who do not wish to receive these communications, the choice between
these options to be determined by national legislation.”).
102
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 2(a) (“Processing of personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”).
103
Id. But see Data Protection Directive, supra note 3 (“‘[P]ersonal data’ shall mean
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”).
104
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 9(3) (“Personal data . . . may be
processed . . . by another person also subject to an obligation of secrecy under Union
or Member State law or rules established by national competent bodies.”).
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the right to rectify any inaccuracies in personal data that concerns him;
an attractive feature of the right is that the requesting data subject has
the right to receive it “without undue delay.”105 A data subject may also
request the completion of incomplete personal data.106
4. Articles 6 & 21 – Lawfulness of Processing, and Right to
Object
The right to object is located under article 21. The GDPR allows
a data subject to protest the processing of data for any of the reasons
under article 6(1)(e) or 6(1)(f)—these provisions govern processing
carried out in the public interest or processing necessary for the
legitimate purposes of the controller or a third party—unless that right
is overridden by the “controller demonstrat[ing] compelling
legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests,
rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment,
exercise or defence of legal claims.”107 The data subject could also
object to his personal data being processed for direct marketing
purposes—including profiling to the extent it relates to said
marketing—and it does not appear that the controller has an
opportunity to rebut the request.108 From the drafting of the provision,
it appears that the right to object applies when data is still in the
processing stage, and is not yet collected, or better yet, stored. While
it might be a worthwhile endeavor to offer a right to object, it is
perplexing to identify what kind of personal data could qualify as being
processed for a public interest or is necessary for the legitimate
purposes of the controller or a third party.109
5. Article 22 – Automated Individual Decision-Making,
Including Profiling
The right not to be subject to “automated individual decisionsmaking,” better understood as profiling, is under article 22.110 Besides

105

Id. art. 16 (“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller
without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or
her.”).
106
Id. (“[T]he data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data
completed . . . .”).
107
Id. art. 21(1).
108
Id. art. 21(2)–(3).
109
It must be that a legitimate purpose would include processing for a “legitimate
business purpose” of the controller, such as payment. Yet, if the personal data
concerns the subject who requested it not be processed in the first place, wouldn’t that
legitimate purpose no longer be valid?
110
See supra note 81.
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the right to be forgotten and the right to object, this right will also have
a substantial effect on a company like LinkedIn.111 The only situations
in which the right would not apply are when the automated decision is
essential in carrying out a contract between the subject and controller,
the decision is authorized by a law to which the controller is held, or
the decision is made possible by the subject’s explicit consent.112 In
general, this right is to the benefit of the data subject since it prohibits
the unreasonable invasion into an individual’s personal preferences
and characteristics; however, a data subject might be caught in a
dilemma if it is found his consent was conditional under article 7 upon
“the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service.”113
The draft first written by the Commission for article 7(1) stated
that the controller would bear the burden of proof for the data
subject’s consent.114 The Council’s revision now stands as requiring the
controller to “be able to demonstrate that the data subject has
consented to processing of his or her personal data” in the context of
article 6(1)(a).115 The Council removed the last provision under article
7, which nullified the legality of any consent provided by the data
subject in the case of a noteworthy imbalance in bargaining power
between the two parties.116 In essence, any ambiguity in the delivery of
consent would be resolved in favor of the controller. In addition, there
is no consideration of the imbalance between parties—likely because
there would often be a vast differential between the two parties—unless
the data subject is a large business.
6. Article 11 – Processing Which does not Require
Identification
Article 11 concerns circumstances in which processing the data
does not, or does no longer, require personal information. In such a
case, the controller does not need to receive further information or

111

The extent of the right not to be subject to profiling and its practical application
is discussed infra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
112
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 22(2)(a)–(c).
113
Id. art. 7(4).
114
Regulation Proposal, supra note 93, at art. 7(1). See supra note 15 for the
definition of a “controller.”
115
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 7(1). Article 6(1)(a) states that
“[p]rocessing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following
applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal
data for one or more specific purposes . . . .”
116
See Regulation Proposal, supra note 93, at art. 7(4) (“Consent shall not provide a
legal basis for the processing, where there is a significant imbalance between the
position of the data subject and the controller.”).
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engage in more processing.117 This is a strength since the provision
does not require controllers to maintain or process more information
than necessary simply to be able to comply with the GDPR;118 this way,
it takes the burden off the controller as soon as the controller no
longer possesses personal data, for whatever reason.
7. Article 17 – Right to Erasure (“Right to be Forgotten”)
The right to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten, is
embodied in article 17.119 The description of the right is as follows:
“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the
erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay
and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data
where one of the following grounds applies . . . .”120 The right may be
exercised when the data is no longer necessary for its initial purpose,121
the data subject withdraws his consent under article 6(1) or article
9(2),122 the subject objects to the processing of personal data under
article 21(1),123 the data has been unlawfully processed,124 the data must
be erased in order to comply with certain legal obligations,125 or the
data has been collected in reference to information services under
article 8(1) (which this Comment does not cover).126
8. Articles 20 & 25 – Rights to Data Portability & Privacy by
Design
Besides the right to be forgotten, discussed infra Part III.D, the
rights to data portability and privacy by design are likely to have an
extensive impact on a global expectation of privacy. These rights can
be thought of as original in the sense that they sound very attractive to
data subjects aching to maintain greater control over their personal
information. On the flip side, they could prove to be immensely
expensive to companies that are not capable of handling hundreds of
117

GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 11(1) (“If the purposes for which a
controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification
of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain,
acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the
sole purpose of complying with this Regulation.”).
118
Id.
119
Id. art. 17.
120
Id. art. 17(1). See supra note 15, for the definition of “controller.”
121
Id. art. 17(1)(a).
122
Id. art. 17(1)(b).
123
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 17(1)(c).
124
Id. art. 17(1)(d).
125
Id. art. 17(1)(e).
126
Id. art. 17(1)(f).
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requests daily to receive, remove, or reorganize personal data.
The right to data portability is encapsulated under article 20 and
offers data subjects the right to require data to be provided in a
commonly-used electronic form.127 Read into the context of article
15—right of access by the data subject—the right to data portability
and the right of access to let a data subject acquire a full copy of
personal data concerning him or her, and: (a) the purposes for the
processing; (b) the categories of personal data involved; (c) recipients
or categories thereof to whom the personal data has been disclosed or
will be disclosed; (d) the period of time for which the personal data
will be stored; (e) the right to request rectification or erasure of
personal data; (f) the right to file a complaint with a supervisory
authority; (g) if personal data is not collected from the data subject,
available information as to where it could be found; and (h) whether
automated decision-making exists.128 One of the few limitations to the
rights of portability and access is that the right to obtain a copy of
personal data being processed may not “adversely affect the rights and
freedoms of others,” nor could the right to data portability as a whole
adversely affect the rights of others.129 In reality, the likelihood that the
request for a data subject’s personal data could affect the rights of
others is potentially very low: unless the nature of the data about the
requesting subject is inextricably linked to another individual who
would take issue with its release, likely the controller would need to
comply with the data subject’s request for data portability and access.
Under the Europe 2020 proposal, what lies critical to the social
benefits of the “Digital Single Market” are the fundamental rights of
every individual user which must be enforced using the widest range
of means: application of the principle of “privacy by design”130 and
exercise of inhibitive sanctions when necessary. Colloquially termed
“privacy by design,” under article 25, this right is called “data
protection by design and by default” and is the idea that privacy and
data protection are, in some way, embedded within the entire life cycle
of hard- and soft-ware, from early design, to use, to disposal.131
127

Id. art. 20(1)(a)–(b) (“The data subject shall have the right to receive the
personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in
a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to
transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to
which the personal data have been provided, where (a) the processing is based on
consent . . . and (b) the processing is carried out by automated means.”).
128
Id. art. 15(1)(a)–(h).
129
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at arts. 15(4), 20(4).
130
A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection, supra note 70, at 12.
131
See generally Charith Perera et al., Privacy-by-Design Framework for Assessing Internet
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Essentially, a controller would ensure that it is limiting the amount of
data it uses to only a minimum amount of personal data; that way, “by
default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific
purpose of the processing are processed.”132 The only problem with
privacy by design is: how could it be enforced? There are too many
variables a regulatory authority would consider before slapping a
company with a fine claiming it did not comply with article 25.133 It
appears that privacy by design is merely a utopian declaration that
from this point forward, all companies should adhere to the ideal of
minimizing the amount of personal data that is required by nature of
their information processing.
These sanctions seem evocative of the procedures the European
Court of Justice discusses in Google Spain, infra Part III.D., proposed
with regard to the “right to be forgotten.” “Privacy by design” suggests
an early acknowledgment that it is within an individual’s fundamental
rights to be able to securely dispose of his data and that it is the
responsibility of the company which processes data to ensure its
infrastructure is designed with privacy in mind.134
D. Evolution of the Right to be Forgotten
Although the right to be forgotten was not included in the Data
Protection Directive, the idea was almost implicit in the document
under article 12.135 Even though the GDPR conflates the two terms
under article 17, which is titled “Right to erasure (‘right to be
forgotten’),” there are debates as to whether the right to be forgotten
and the right to erasure represent the same idea. According to one
author, the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten are
interchangeable terms.136 Another author argues that the two do not
of Things Applications and Platforms, CORNELL UNIV. LIBR. 4 (2016), https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1609.04060.pdf.
132
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 25(2).
133
Id. art. 25(1) (“Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of
implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as
the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of natural persons
posed by the processing . . . .”).
134
A ready list of which companies have embraced the philosophy is not yet
available, and might never be. Therein lies one of the difficulties in applying this
framework: it would be near impossible to quantify who did or did not adopt the
scheme.
135
See Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection rules,
supra note 14.
136
Cooper Mitchell-Rekrut, Note, Search Engine Liability Under the Libe Data
Regulation Proposal: Interpreting Third Party Responsibilities as Informed by Google Spain, 45
GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, Abstract (2014) (“The ‘right to be forgotten’—now branded as
the ‘right to erasure’—has been publicized as one of the ‘four pillars’ of the EU’s
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represent the same idea, as the right to be forgotten includes data “that
does not breach any norm.”137 Such a norm could be any general
provision of the Directive or Regulation. The right to erasure “allows
data subjects to request the elimination of their personal data when its
retention or processing violates the terms of the directive, in particular
(but not exclusively) because of being incomplete or inaccurate.”138
On the other hand, enforcing the right to be forgotten would cause
deletion of personal information regardless of whether the
information proved harmful or was illegally processed.139
1. Google Spain Case
The first time the European Court of Justice (ECJ) heard a case
involving the right to be forgotten was in Google Spain SL v. Gonzalez.140
Mario Costeja Gonzalez, a Spanish national, filed a complaint with the
Spanish Data Protection Agency against La Vanguardia Ediciones SL—
the publisher of a daily newspaper—and against Google Spain and
Google, Inc.141 Gonzalez claimed that when any user entered
Gonzalez’s name into a Google search engine, the results would link
to two pages of La Vanguardia’s newspaper, January 1998 and March
1998, respectively.142 Those pages did not speak well of Gonzalez
because they announced a real estate auction effected for the recovery
of social security debts owed by Gonzalez.143 First, Gonzalez requested
that La Vanguardia either remove or alter the pages—so that the
material would no longer be widely available—or use search engines
to protect the data; second, Gonzalez requested that Google Spain or
Google, Inc. remove or suppress the data so that it no longer linked to
La Vanguardia.144 Gonzalez supported his assertions by referencing the
fact that the attachment proceedings had been resolved and thus that
retaining the data was irrelevant.145
The court held that by searching for information published on
the Internet, the data user “collects” data within the meaning of the
proposed General Data Protection Regulation.”).
137
Ignacio Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right To Be Forgotten?, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 1, 8 (2015).
138
Id. at 6.
139
Id. at 8.
140
See Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Case
C-131/12, [2014] E.C.R. I-317, EU:C:2014:317.
141
Id. ¶¶ 2, 14.
142
Id. ¶ 14.
143
Id.
144
Id. ¶ 15.
145
Id.
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Directive.146 The data user is the “controller” in respect of the
processing of the search engine.147 The operator of the search engine
is—in certain circumstances—responsible for removing links to web
pages that are published by third parties which contain information
relating to a person from the list of results displayed.148 Such an
obligation may also exist when the name or information is not erased
from those pages and even when initial publication was lawful.
A fair balance should be struck between the interest of potential
future users in the data sought and the data subject’s fundamental
rights. Courts must consider: (1) the nature of the information; (2)
the sensitivity for the data subject’s private life; and (3) the interest of
the public in having that information.149
The ECJ recognized a right to be forgotten under the Data
Protection Directive.150 The court found that a citizen may require a
provider like Google to remove his or her name from searches if the
personal data has become inadequate, irrelevant, and excessive in
relation to the purpose for which it was originally processed due to the
lapse of time.151
2. Schrems Case
The second pivotal case the ECJ heard implicating—though never
directly referring to—the right to be forgotten was in 2015, in
Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner.152 Maximilian
Schrems filed a class-action-type civil suit in Ireland against the Data
Protection Commission, alleging that Facebook Ireland violated data
use policy, did not provide effective consent to many types of data use,
supported the NSA’s PRISM surveillance program,153 tracked Internet
146

Google Spain SL, [2014] E.C.R. I-317, ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 21.
148
Id. ¶ 62.
149
Id. ¶ 81.
150
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at art. 12.
151
Patrick Van Eecke & Jim Halpert, The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Today’s Information
Age, 32 WESTLAW J. 1, 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/
Insights/Publications/2014/12/The_right_to_be_forgotten_in_todays_info_age.pdf.
152
Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14,
EU:C:2015:650.
153
The PRISM surveillance program—the existence of which was leaked by
Edward Snowden—is an American surveillance program that was started in 2007
whose purpose is to monitor the communications of users on nine popular Internet
services: Microsoft, Apple, Google, Facebook, Skype, AOL, PalTalk, Yahoo, and
YouTube. It was tacitly confirmed by the Obama Administration, but technology
companies have denied their participation. Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know
About PRISM to Date, WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
147
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users on external websites, monitored and analyzed users through “big
data” systems, unlawfully introduced “graph search,” and passed user
data to external applications without authorization of the data user.154
Procedurally, the following occurred: the Safe Harbor was sent to the
European Court of Justice;155 and the case was tried in 2015 in the
European Court of Justice, but the opinion by Advocate General Bot
was delayed,156 likely because of talks behind closed doors between the
US and the EU. Following the postponement, the plaintiff applied to
have the case considered in the first instance in the Vienna Regional
Court (Landesgericht), but the court found that a “class action” is not
admissible on procedural grounds.157 The case was appealed to the
The
Higher
Regional
Court
(Oberlandesgericht).158
Oberlandesgericht was to decide whether class actions are lawful; as
the matter stands, the case has been referred to the European Court
of Justice, once more.159 The reason the case was referred so quickly to
the ECJ in the first place was because, as Mr. Schrems called it, the
courts were “playing hot potato,” either being unwilling to answer the
difficult questions posed, or simply at wits’ end.160 If nothing else, Mr.
Schrems joked that he would like to be the litigant who had appeared
most often in front of the ECJ.161
On September 24, 2015, Advocate General Yves Bot released his
opinion, in which he ruled that: the Safe Harbor was invalid; the Irish
Data Planning Commissioner could not rely on the Safe Harbor;
American companies which have active “safe harbor” certification
would need to find another basis to transfer data from the US to the
EU, such as “Binding Corporate Rules” included in the data protection
directive; and Facebook did not participate in mass surveillance in the
United States, nor was EU data made available to American
authorities.162
news/wonk/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/.
154
Class Action Against Facebook Ireland, EUR. VERSUS FACEBOOK (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/Complaints/Class_Action/class_action.html.
155
News, EUR. VERSUS FACEBOOK (Mar. 25, 2015), http://europe-v-facebook.org/E
N/en.html.
156
Id. (June 9, 2015).
157
Id. (Oct. 21, 2015).
158
Id. (Nov. 23, 2015).
159
Id. (Sept. 12, 2016). It stands to reason that what the European Court of Justice
decides pertaining to class actions could be a separate topic ripe for discussion.
160
Maximilian Schrems, Initiator of Europe v. Facebook, Address at the CUNY
Graduate Center: The US v. Europe v. Facebook: Digital Divisions? (Feb. 22, 2016)
[hereinafter Schrems Lecture].
161
Id.
162
See CJEU: First Reaction to AG’s Opinion on NSA “PRISM” Scandal Facebook’s EU-US
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On October 6, 2015, the CJEU found that: transfers of personal
data between third countries should not be given lower levels of
protection than transfers within the European Union;163 Decision
2000/520164—which implemented the safe harbor privacy principles—
does not contain sufficient guarantees;165 and finally that Facebook did
not breach the safe harbor principles,166 but that its interference with
the fundamental rights of EU citizens was contrary to provisions of the
Charter because it did not pursue an “objective of general interest
defined with sufficient precision.”167 In late October 2015, the Higher
Regional Court issued a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that
the plaintiff is not a “professional litigant,” so he is entitled to bring his
claims in his home court, but the status of the class action remains in
dispute so the regional court referred it to the Austrian Supreme
Court.168
There are some practical difficulties in implementing the findings
of this decision. The right to be forgotten allows an individual to
control his personal data if it is no longer necessary for its original
purpose, or if for some other reason, he wishes to withdraw consent as
to its processing, among other reasons.169 As a result, there would be
higher protection for individuals and the right could ensure a more
effective regulatory scheme. In reality, however, is it possible to ask a
company to delete information that was posted by an individual, in
light of the fact that it might have been widely distributed already?
When Mr. Schrems engaged in his “war” against Facebook, he
requested all of the documents that the company possessed about him:
what he received was a log of every single bit of information that even
mentioned his name, whether it was still on the website or supposedly
deleted a long time ago, in a huge stack of papers.170 This occurrence
symbolizes the fact that although the GDPR might convince companies
to remove information from their websites that consumers request be

Data Transfers Under “Safe Harbor” Not Legal, EUR. VERSUS FACEBOOK (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/GA_en.pdf.
163
Maximilian Schrems, EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 144.
164
See Commission Decision 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (EC).
165
Maximilian Schrems, EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 159.
166
Id. ¶ 168.
167
Id. ¶ 181.
168
Media Update for 21/10/2015, EUR. VERSUS FACEBOOK (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/PA_OLG_en.pdf.
169
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 17. See Guide to the General Data Protection
Regulation, BIRD & BIRD 31 (Jan. 2017), https://www.twobirds.com/~/media/pdfs/gd
pr-pdfs/bird—bird—guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation.pdf?la=en.
170
Schrems Lecture, supra note 160.
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taken down, it might never truly disappear.171 In the struggle to
immortalize the privacy right and render it tangible, privacy advocates
have taken a picture of this stack of papers to the extent that Schrems
joked about it and said, “It’s probably the most filmed stack of papers,
ever!”172 This massive interest in Schrems’ stack of papers is the
European and American attempt at rendering palpable this elusive
privacy right. In reality, it is unclear what actual privacy the right to be
forgotten provides.
IV. LINKEDIN AND HOW IT WILL BE AFFECTED
A. The Unique Nature of LinkedIn
LinkedIn was officially launched on May 5, 2003.173 The
company’s mission is to “connect the world’s professionals to make
them more productive and successful.”174 From its mission statement,
LinkedIn expects to be able to extend its social network to people and
businesses worldwide, which would certainly include Europe and the
European Union Members.
LinkedIn is unique from other popular social networks because
its primary mission is to connect professionals around the world.175
From the onset, the nature of its enterprise indicates that it is likely the
company’s users would benefit from engaging in more secure
practices: this view is a result of the perception that reputation is
fundamental to any individual using the site. Unlike other social
networks, certain entities—namely employers—seek a certain category
of individuals—employees—and vice versa. Employees and employers
171

Although outside of the scope of this Comment, “processors” which processed
personal data on behalf of the controllers, could still maintain copies of that removed
data, as there appears to be little to no regulation of the activities of processors in the
GDPR.
172
Id.
173
About Us, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/about-us?trk=uno-reg-guesthome-about (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
174
Id.
175
The most popular social networks that resemble LinkedIn include Facebook,
Twitter, Google Plus+, and VK. Facebook’s mission statement is “to give people the
power to share and make the world more open and connected.” About, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
Twitter’s mission is “[t]o give everyone the power to create and share ideas and
information
instantly,
without
barriers.”
About,
TWITTER,
https://about.twitter.com/company?lang=en (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). Google+ is
“a place to connect with friends and family, and explore all of your interests.” About,
GOOGLE+, https://plus.google.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). “VK is a social network
that unites people all over the world and helps them communicate comfortably and
promptly.” About VK, VK, http://www.vk.com/about (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
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would likely not seek out like categories of individuals, unless the
intention was to engage in a forum.
B. Current Policies in Place
Through its exclusive applications, LinkedIn engages in
marketing and sales to optimize business solutions to employers.
LinkedIn collects information from the devices and networks used to
access the site. It has access to: (1) cookies;176 (2) IP addresses;177 (3)
URLs from whence users arrived at the page; (4) URLs to which the
users go; (5) OS details;178 (6) types of Internet browsers; (7) mobile
IDs; and (8) location data.179 Taking into account the rather large
amount of personal identifying information to which the company has
access, it is necessary to taper its effects with some safeguards for users.
As a result, LinkedIn allows individual users a great deal of control over
the content they post on the site. Under its “User Agreement,”180
176

There is an entire Cookie Policy dedicated to describing detailed information
about how the website uses cookies. Cookies on the LinkedIn site, LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/cookie-policy?trk=hb_ft_cookie (last visited Mar. 23,
2016).
177
An IP address is a number which uniquely identifies a computer and any other
electronic device on a computer network protocol, called TCP/IP. Bradley Mitchell,
What is an IP Address?, LIFEWIRE (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-anip-address-818393.
178
OS stands for “operating system,” which is a program that controls and manages
the hardware and software on a computer. Tim Fisher, Definition of an Operating System,
LIFEWIRE (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/operating-systems-2652912.
179
Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN § 1.10, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacypolicy?trk=hb_ft_priv (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
180
The Rights and Limits to the “User Agreement” provide as follows:
As between you and LinkedIn, you own the content and information that you
submit or post to the Services and you are only granting LinkedIn the
following non-exclusive license: A worldwide, transferable and
sublicensable right to use, copy, modify, distribute, publish, and process,
information and content that you provide through our Services, without
any further consent, notice and/or compensation to you or others.
These rights are limited in the following ways:
a. You can end this license for specific content by deleting such
content from the Services, or generally by closing your account,
except (a) to the extent you shared it with others as part of
the Service and they copied or stored it and (b) for the
reasonable time it takes to remove from backup and other
systems.
b. We will not include your content in advertisements for the
products and services of others (including sponsored
content) to others without your separate consent. However, we
have the right, without compensation to you or others, to
serve ads near your content and information, and your
comments on sponsored content may be visible as noted in
the Privacy Policy.
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LinkedIn provides a user’s “Rights and Limits” to include: (1) the
ability to end LinkedIn’s broad license to the user’s content by deleting
his content from the website or closing his account; (2) the
requirement of user’s consent before information is used in ads for
products and services of others; (3) the requirement of user’s consent
before others may publish posts; and (4) the right not to have
LinkedIn modify “the meaning of [the user’s] expression.” LinkedIn
has already included in its User Agreement a rather liberal policy with
a few safeguards to user’s privacy and freedom to take down certain
kinds of information.
C. Which Provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
Would Apply
Under article 23 of the Preamble, the GDPR aims to cover
activities of outside controllers when such outside controllers’
processing activities are related to the offering of goods or services, or
to the monitoring of the behavior of such data subjects.181 The
question is whether LinkedIn provides goods or services. Neither term
is defined under article 4,182 nor under the Data Protection Directive.
A definition of the terms might be presumed from the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a quasi-constitutional
document.183 Under the Treaty of Lisbon—which in 2009 amended
c.

We will get your consent if we want to give others the right to publish
your posts beyond the Service. However, other Members and/or
Visitors may access and share your content and information,
consistent with your settings and degree of connection with
them.
d. While we may edit and make formatting changes to your
content (such as translating it, modifying the size, layout or
file type or removing metadata), we will not modify the meaning
of your expression.
e. Because you own your content and information and we only
have non-exclusive rights to it, you may choose to make it
available to others, including under the terms of a Creative
Commons license.
User
Agreement,
LINKEDIN
§
3.1,
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/useragreement?trk=hb_ft_userag (last visited Dec. 21, 2016) (emphasis added).
181
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at pbl. (23) (“In order to ensure that natural
persons are not deprived of the protection to which they are entitled under this
Regulation, the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by
a controller or a processor not established in the Union should be subject to this
Regulation where the processing activities are related to offering goods or services to such data
subjects irrespective of whether connected to a payment.”) (emphasis added).
182
The definitions in the article are limited to various aspects of data and some
definitions of a business nature, among other independent terms.
183
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU].
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the TFEU and the Treaty of Rome—Title II, article 28, “goods” include
“products originating in Member States and . . . products coming from
third countries which are in free circulation in Member States.”184
“Free circulation” implies that: (1) import formalities have been
conformed to; (2) customs duties or charges have been levied; and (3)
the provider did not endure a total or partial drawback of the duties
or charges.185 On the converse, “services” include: (a) activities of an
industrial character; (b) activities of a commercial character; (c)
activities of craftsmen; and (d) activities of the professions.186
Under the definitions of goods and services in the TFEU, it would
likely not be true that LinkedIn satisfies the requirement of offering
any goods to parties in the European Union; it would, however, fall
under the offering of services. Under TFEU article 57(b)—activities
of a commercial nature—and article 57(d)—activities of the
professions—there is likely a strong argument that LinkedIn engages
in activities of a commercial nature, since it engages in marketing,
sales, and in activities of the professions.187 LinkedIn offers the
following marketing products: “Lead Accelerator,” “Sponsored
Updates,” “Sponsored InMail,” “Display Ads,” and “Text Ads.”188 These
marketing campaigns allow companies to employ various approaches
to ensuring that target audiences—whether they are sales teams or
prospective employees—are contacted in a way that best suits their
needs and is especially likely to get their attention. LinkedIn offers
companies the option of “social selling,” through its application called
“LinkedIn Sales Navigator.”189 Through the navigator, companies are
driven to make the right connections and sell their goals and
aspirations to people whom they would personally affect.190

184

Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, art. 28, 2007 O.J. C 306 [hereinafter Treaty of
Lisbon].
185
TFEU, supra note 183, at art. 29.
186
Id. art. 57.
187
There has been little case law regarding the definition of “activities of the
professions.” Most case law has focused on defining whether the term refers to a type
of service, and has always been found to do so. See Hubbard, Case C-20/92, [1993]
E.C.R. I-3777. Examples of “professions” have included individuals in the health
profession, legal profession, and other regulated professions. See, e.g., Khatzithanasis,
Case C-151/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-9013; Commission v. Italy, Case 168/85, [1986] E.C.R.
I-2945.
188
Market to who matters, LINKEDIN, https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solu
tions (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
189
Sales Navigator, LINKEDIN, https://business.linkedin.com/biz/sales-solutions/
b2b-sales-navigator (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
190
Id.
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There is an especially strong argument that LinkedIn would satisfy
the services definition under its activities of the professions, since it
provides a gateway for employees and employers to reach out across
the platform and benefit from interacting with each other. Even if
LinkedIn was to be free from the goods and services analysis, it would
certainly fall under the realm of monitoring the behavior of its data
subjects. It is already clear through the brief description of the sales
and marketing in which LinkedIn engages that it would likely qualify
as applying a “profile” to an individual. Again, the GDPR describes
that the act of profiling targets decisions concerning the data subject
for analyzing or predicting his personal preferences, behaviors, and
attitudes.191
D. Which Aspects of Business Would Change
LinkedIn announced its Fourth Quarter results on February 4,
2016.192 In a news release, the CEO, Jeff Weiner, exalted, “Q4 was a
strong quarter for LinkedIn . . . . We enter 2016 with increased focus
on core initiatives that will drive leverage across our portfolio of
products.”193 LinkedIn’s revenue increased by thirty-five percent in
2015 from $862 million to $2.991 billion.194 LinkedIn started off 2016
in a good place; the question is: would the Privacy Shield now cost the
company dearly? LinkedIn doesn’t think so; in October 2016,
LinkedIn released the following in response to user inquiries on its
Help page:
LinkedIn is in the process of evaluating the Privacy Shield
and its benefits for our members and customers. In the
meantime, we continue to rely on Standard Contractual
Clauses as a legal mechanism for data transfers from the
EU. . . . Notably, these Standard Contractual Clauses,
adopted by the EU Commission have not been invalidated by
the ECJ decision. . . . [T]hese clauses are contractual
commitments between companies transferring personal
data . . . binding them to protect the privacy and security of
the data. . . . . We remain committed to ensuring that our
members continue to be able to use our services to advance
191

GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 4(4).
LinkedIn Corporation Trended Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets, LINKEDIN
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://snap.licdn.com/microsites/content/dam/press/DownloadAssets/Media%20Resources/Quarterly-Reports/Q4-2015-Consolidated-Metrics.pdf.
193
LinkedIn Corporate Communications Team, LinkedIn Announces Fourth Quarter
and Full Year 2015 Results, LINKEDIN (Feb. 4, 2016), https://press.linkedin.com/siteresources/news-releases/2016/linkedin-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2015results.
194
Id.
192
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their careers and pursue professional opportunities
worldwide.195
The company intends to rely on the Standard Contractual
Clauses, which were provided by the European Commission in 2010 in
compliance with the Data Protection Directive.196 The European
Commission drafted these clauses as models for what businesses could
include in their protection regimes with the knowledge that these
clauses have already been deemed to provide adequate protection.197
The retreat to the Standard Contractual Clauses is explained by
reference to the publications of numerous law firms, which have
advised their client companies that the clauses would be a means to
legitimize international transfers of data.198 However, it stands to
reason if these clauses are not grandfathered into the GDPR, they
would be reexamined in the future, as well.199
Assuming LinkedIn will need to find an alternative to the clauses,
the company would no longer be capable of engaging in the extent of
the profiling in which it currently engages; this “data minimization”
would likely apply to every social network. The company would likely
need to modify its Rights and Limits under the User Agreement. As it
currently stands, it would not comply with the “right to be forgotten”
195

EU Data Transfers and the Safe Harbor, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help
/linkedin/answer/62533/eu-data-transfers-and-the-safe-harbor?lang=en (last visited
Jan. 31, 2017).
196
Commission Decision on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of
personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5.
197
Id. art. 1.
198
See, e.g., Will EU Standard Contractual Clauses be declared invalid as well?,
LINKLATERS, http://linklaters.de/aktuelles/themen/after-safe-harbor-will-eu-stand
ard-contractual-clauses-be-invalid.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2016); Lothar Determann
et al., The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Versus Other EU Data Transfer Compliance Options,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sep. 12, 2016), https://www.bna.com/euus-privacy-shieldn57982076824/; Privacy Shield is final: What it means for businesses, DLA PIPER (July 21,
2016),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2016/07/privacyshield-is-final/; Richard Dickinson et al., EU-US Privacy Shield Adopted: Where Do We Go
From Here?, ARNOLD & PORTER (July 18, 2016), http://www.arnoldporter.com/en/pers
pectives/publications/2016/07/eu-us-privacy-shield-adopted-where; Top Ten – EU
Data Transfers: Comparing the Proposed Privacy Shield to the Standard Contractual Clauses,
ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL (May 24, 2016), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/public
ations/topten/transferring-personal-data.cfm.
199
Accord Will EU Standard Contractual Clauses be declared invalid as well?, supra note
198. For now, the Article 29 Working Party has confirmed that the Clauses are still
valid. Cameron F. Kerry et al., Article 29 Working Party Confirms that EU Standard
Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules are Still Valid – for the Time-Being, SIDLEY
AUSTIN (Feb. 3, 2016), http://datamatters.sidley.com/article-29-working-party-confir
ms-that-eu-standard-contractual-clauses-and-binding-corporate-rules-are-still-valid-forthe-time-being/.
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as it has been provided for in the GDPR and its likely future
interpretation as a result of the case law. The agreement does,
however, provide ample consent provisions. These provisions would
likely need to be made more apparent to the future users. LinkedIn
would likely need to implement a divulgence policy regarding their
users’ right of access to their personal data. Users would need to be
informed of how long their information would be stored, their right to
rectify any incomplete or false information about them, their right to
request an erasure of any information pertaining to them, and their
right to lodge a complaint if the request is not complied with.
However, LinkedIn might not need to disclose any more
information than it already has about its profiling if it falls under one
of the exceptions in the GDPR article 22(2)(a)–(c).200 Subsection (a)
of this article considers whether entering into a contract immediately
initiates the processing, and if the subject’s rights have been
maintained through the disclosure of information; if so, then the
profiling has been authorized.201 Subsection (b) considers whether the
processing was authorized by a Member State and lays down
procedures by which the subject’s interests are protected.202
Subsection (c) considers whether the data subject gave consent under
article 7 (Conditions for consent).203
In the same vein, given the extent of the influence that LinkedIn
exerts and its consistent growth, it is very likely that the
implementation of the Privacy Shield and the GDPR will have a
negligible effect on LinkedIn’s ability to do business. LinkedIn has
built-in mechanisms that can address changes in regulations,
underscored by its news release that references changing regulations
and the constant need to adapt to existing technology. Since its
inception in 2003, LinkedIn has experienced little to no technologies
that have so rigorously threatened LinkedIn’s business model as to put
it out of business. In thirteen years, LinkedIn has built a sustainable
model, which will certainly adapt to changing rules and regulations.
The same, however, cannot be said for companies that want to make
their first step into the European market: with these new rigorous
200

GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 22(2)(a)–(c) (“Paragraph 1 shall not
apply if the decision [including profiling]: (a) is necessary for entering into, or
performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller; (b) is
authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject . . .; or (c)
is based on the data subject’s explicit consent.”). See also supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
201
See id. art. 22(2)(a).
202
See id. art. 22(2)(b).
203
See id. art. 22(2)(c).
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requirements—enforceable or not—new businesses might find
themselves dissuaded from the European market until they make
enough revenue to instill greater data protection. On the other hand,
new companies might want to take their chances with provisions such
as privacy by design, which do not have any teeth to them.
V. NEW ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE GDPR
A. Google Glass Version 2
Google Glass was a headset designed by Google meant to be worn
like a pair of eyeglasses, with “a small prism-like screen tucked into the
upper corner of the frame” that allowed its user to remain engaged
with his electronics, such as a phone or e-mail account.204 The purpose
behind the technology was to allow a user to disengage with electronics
by never needing to look down at a screen.205 According to one author,
the original Google Glass failed because there was no real product
launch, no mainstream advertising campaign, no proper explanation
about its noteworthy features, and no easy way to purchase the
product.206 Google made a second attempt, made public on December
28, 2015, through a few FCC filings detailing the next version of
Google Glass.207 Google expected that the second time, the product
would be successful because it was no longer aimed at the general
public, but rather meant to be used in the business marketplace.208
Google Glass, though, was not meant to be; still, the end of Google
Glass is not the end of smartglasses.209 These new developments would
204

Hayley Tsukayama, Everything You Need to Know About Google Glass, WASH. POST
(Feb. 27, 2014, 12:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp
/2014/02/27/everything-you-need-to-know-about-google-glass/.
205
Id.
206
Siimon Reynolds, Why Google Glass Failed: A Marketing Lesson, FORBES (Feb. 5,
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/siimonreynolds/2015/02/05/why-google-glassfailed/#55600c412131.
207
A few photos of the new device could be seen at: OET Exhibits List, U.S. FED.
COMM. COMMISSION (June 12, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/View
ExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&ap
plication_id=eDyH1HI%2FRcK9NnzZ4ggP6w%3D%3D&fcc_id=A4R-GG1.
208
Jon Phillips, Google Glass Version 2: New Photos in FCC Filing, COMPUTERWORLD
(Dec. 28, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3018501/wearab
les/google-glass-version-2-new-photos-in-fcc-filing.html.
209
Hugh Langley, The patented history and future of. . .Google Glass: Quite the spectacle,
WAREABLE (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.wareable.com/google/the-patented-historyand-future-of-google-glass-656 (“As we said at the start of this piece, the past hints to
the future, and we’d bet our bottom dollar that some of these ideas are still being
worked on somewhere in Alphabet land. We still haven’t seen many of the patented
concepts appear in the flesh, including some of the more advanced gesture controls
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bear further legal complications; if, for example, smartglasses were to
enter the corporate market, employers could require employees to use
the technology for much of the day. To what extent would the
employers be capable of monitoring employees through accessing
their smartglasses?
B. Car-to-Car Communication
Some cars on the road today already have the capability to brake
in case their drivers do not foresee an impending collision. Examples
of such top-of-the-line cars include the PRE-SAFE® system on select
Mercedes-Benz models, Toyota’s pre-collision safety, and Lexus’ precollision system with pedestrian detection on select SUV models.210
The state of technology currently consists of using radar or ultrasound
to detect obstacles or vehicles; but cars could only use this technology
to the extent that they could detect the nearest obstruction.211
Developing technology leads cars into a realm in which they are
capable of broadcasting their location, speed, steering-wheel position,
brake status, and a variety of other data points to cars in a couple of
hundred meters from their location.212 Despite the fact that companies
like AT&T, with its Connected Car, and General Motors, with its carto-car communication in a 2017-model Cadillac, are pioneering
immense changes in the landscape of vehicle safety, it might take
longer than a decade for talking cars to prove a reality, and especially
for that market to expand to Europe.213
C. Network of Millions of Genomes
Most people have at least heard of the Human Genome Project, a
scientific endeavor initiated in 1990 with the intended goal of mapping
the human genome.214 The project, started by the National Center for

and minimal designs.”).
210
Safety, MERCEDES-BENZ (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.mbusa.com/mercedes
/benz/safety#module-1; Toyota Safety Sense, TOYOTA (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.toy
ota-global.com/safety-sense/; Safety, LEXUS (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.lexus.com/
models/RX/safety.
211
Will Knight, Car-to-Car Communication: A Simple Wireless Technology Promises to
Make Driving Much Safer, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.technologyrev
iew.com/s/534981/car-to-car-communication/.
212
Id.
213
Id.; see also Connected Car, AT&T, https://www.att.com/shop/wireless/connect
ed-car.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016); News and Stories, GENERAL MOTORS,
http://www.gm.com/all-news-stories.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
214
An Overview of the Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/12011239/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).

SAFARI_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

4/16/2017 3:56 PM

COMMENT

845

Human Genome Research, combined with the United States
Department of Energy to become the International Human Genome
Project.215 The legacy that the project created when it was complete in
April 2003 is being capitalized on every year, from the project
ENCODE to the promotion of a Genomic Data Sharing Policy.216 The
most recent and riveting research project is entitled the Matchmaker
Exchange. Matchmaker Exchange was founded in 2013 with the goal
of building a network on the 200,000 genomes that have already been
mapped (Exchange) of phenotypic and genotypic profiles, and then
linking those profiles (Matchmaker) to similar cases in order to find
genetic causes for patients with rare diseases.217 Doctors cannot
diagnose patients with rare diseases because they are not definitively
confident about what causes the genetic variances to occur.218 The
beauty of the enterprise is all that is needed to equip researchers with
the causative gene is a single additional case with the same deleterious
variant: finding one other person with that same variant solves the
puzzle.219
D. Long-Term Effect of the GDPR on Emerging Technologies
These technological advances point to the fact that it would be
difficult to maintain a few of the rights encapsulated in the GDPR,
particularly the right to be forgotten. With regard to the Matchmaker
Exchange, the GDPR properly dispensed with the following concern:
if a European with a rare disease was given the option to remove files
indicating her genetic variance and she was the only person
documented with that variance, she would deprive any other
individuals with that variance from ever having the ability to determine
what rare disease they possess; her privacy concerns would overtake the
ability to provide another affected individual proper medical care.
Article 89, however, did not provide for such an exception.220 Apropos
215

About the Institute, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/
10001763/about-nhgri-a-brief-history-and-timeline/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
216
See generally About NHGRI: A Brief History and Timeline, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES.
INST., http://www.genome.gov/10001763#2003 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
217
The Solution, MATCHMAKER EXCHANGE, http://www.matchmakerexchange.org/
(last visited Apr. 24, 2016). See Antonio Regalado, Internet of DNA: A Global Network of
Millions of Genomes Could be Medicine’s Next Great Advance, MIT TECH. REV. (2015),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/535016/internet-of-dna/.
218
Id.
219
The Challenge, MATCHMAKER EXCHANGE, http://www.matchmakerexchange.org
/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
220
GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 89 (“Processing for archiving purposes
in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes,
shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the
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connected cars, attempting to retrieve information from the vehicles
would likely constitute a breach of privacy, concerning which a data
subject would be given permission to remove data. An additional
difficulty would be that of the hypothesized embedded chips in human
bodies: retrieving information from the chips would indisputably
entail a breach of the most sacred privacy.
One author analyzed the right to privacy and control over one’s
data, and concluded that although too little privacy endangers
democracy, the same could be said if constituents have too much
privacy.221 Evgeny Morozov devised a theory of the “invisible barbed
wire,” in which he postulates: “The invisible barbed wire of big data
limits our lives to a space that might look quiet and enticing enough
but is not of our own choosing and that we cannot rebuild or
expand.”222 As for what more personal data on the Internet leads to,
he concluded that, “[t]he more information we reveal about ourselves,
the denser but more invisible this barbed wire becomes.”223 Quoting
Spiros Simitis, Germany’s leading privacy scholar and practitioner,
Morozov disagreed with the libertarian approach espoused by Simitis,
and stated the following very aptly:
[N]o progress can be achieved, he said, as long as privacy
protection is “more or less equated with an individual’s right
to decide when and which data are to be accessible.” The
trap that many well-meaning privacy advocates fall into is
thinking that if only they could provide the individual with
more control over his or her data—through stronger laws or
a robust property regime—then the invisible barbed wire
would become visible and fray. It won’t—not if that data is
eventually returned to the very institutions that are erecting
the wire around us.224
Morozov’s reasoning sheds light on the fact that the opportunity
to control one’s data may not only be a fallacy, but it would likely only
tighten the noose around data users.

rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical
and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for
the principle of data minimisation.”)
221
Evgeny Morozov, The Real Privacy Problem, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 22, 2013),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520426/the-real-privacy-problem/.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A NEW GLOBAL STANDARD
The General Data Protection Regulation comes into full effect in
May 2018; until then, the Privacy Shield will need to endure at least
one challenge in the General Court in the European Court of Justice
and adapt its provisions to conform to the GDPR, not the Directive.
Most American companies will continue to resort to use of the
Standard Contractual Clauses, until such future point that the
European Commission deems them no longer in compliance with the
GDPR. It appears that the rights to data portability, to access, to data
minimization, and to be forgotten will dramatically increase data users’
capacity to control what personal data will be available to others—and
what data they could acquire themselves—after it has been published
on the Internet. The fact that virtually any personal data would
become vulnerable—even data that is not particularly harmful or was
not illegally published in the first place—supports the proposition that
there will be an influx of individuals who will request erasure of their
personal information immediately upon the application of the GDPR
in 2018. As a means of preventing this constant debacle among
websites and individuals, it is likely that companies will institute more
stringent privacy requirements and will make them easily detectable
on their websites.
As it stands, the stance of the new presidential administration is
uncertain. President Donald Trump has commented on certain
surveillance issues, but has not taken an official stance on
technology.225 Ted Dean, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Services at the
Department of Commerce, commented, “Bear in mind the history of
the Safe Harbor program, which was negotiated under the Clinton
administration, implemented under the Bush administration and
continued under the Obama administration. This is the type of
program that carries on across administrations.”226
Though
precedence is by no means the only condition for a good policy, the
Privacy Shield—as the successor to the Safe Harbor—would likely
withstand the inauguration of new leadership in the United States.
That being said, the Privacy Shield’s peaceful transition into a new
administration on its own does not ensure the continuing viability of
225

Nicky Stewart, The Trump effect, ITPROPORTAL (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.it
proportal.com/features/the-trump-effect/; Stuart Lauchlan, Privacy Shield – under fire
from activists with Donald Trump yet to show his hand, DIGINOMICA, LTD. (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://diginomica.com/2016/12/20/privacy-shield-fire-activists-donald-trump-yetshow-hand/.
226
David Meyer, The Trump effect on Privacy Shield: ‘There’s a great deal that’s unknown’,
INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-trumpeffect-on-privacy-shield-theres-a-great-deal-thats-unknown/.
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the program.
For current technology moguls, such as Google, Facebook,
LinkedIn, Yahoo, and others, it appears that just as they have been
flexible with responding to changing technologies in the past, so they
will be flexible with responding to the Privacy Shield and GDPR. What
is most worrisome is the ability of new companies to adapt to this
changing climate, and the actuality with which the right to be
forgotten, right to data portability, and especially, privacy by design,
will significantly affect these emerging companies’ business models.
The right to be forgotten might essentially disappear from the actual
application of the GDPR with the widespread use of some newer
technologies because they would prove to substantially undermine the
entire purpose of these inventions; this might occur either through
amendment of the GDPR or through practice.
There is no doubt that a huge shift in the understanding of the
protection of private information will occur over the next year within
the European Union and with its relationship with the United States.
This shift could also bring great privacy improvements for American
residents as well, because if companies must adhere to heightened
requirements so that they could conduct business in the Union, they
might as well implement those safeguards for their employees and
American customers, too. Likewise, as the United States previously set
the guideposts for Internet usage with its advent, it will do it again
through compliance with the Privacy Shield and, implicitly, with the
General Data Protection Regulation; except this time, American
companies are being motivated by the European Union.

